



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Background



- This brief was prepared by the V Corps Battle Staff and presented to CG on 3 March 2003
- CG notes/guidance are outlined in the last slide
- Hidden slides were hidden during the briefing but have been included for background reference

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Mission Analysis Brief




- Current Status of CFLCC Planning
- CFLCC
 - Mission
 - Intent
 - AO
 - Forces
 - COMCFLCC Concept
- V Corps assigned AO
- V Corps specified tasks
- Planning Imperatives/way ahead


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Purpose

- Provide the CG with an initial understanding of:
 - The CFLCC Mission and Intent
 - Characteristics of the V Corps AO
 - Tasks assigned V Corps

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
Current Phase IV B Planning Status

- CFLCC Change 2 to OPLAN 1003 V
 - Dtd 15 February 2003
 - Additional requirements for Phase IV B/CMO instructions for Phase III C/IV A
- CFLCC Planning Order Change 3
 - Dtd 18 February 2003
 - Directed production of a sequel plan for OPLAN 1003V
- CFLCC CONPLAN ECLIPSE II
 - Draft dtd 1 March 2003
- *Base plan release TBD*

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COMCFLCC Tasks

Planning Order Draft dtd 18 February




- Defeat remaining pockets of organized Iraqi military resistance IOT establish a safe environment for post-hostility operations.
- Continue SSE IOT control Iraqi WMD resources and infrastructure. Identify and detain personnel indicted for war crimes (PIFWCs).
- Support CFCs establishment of an interim authority.
- Clear critical life support infrastructure (power, water, sanitation) and oil infrastructure of obstacles, mines, UXO and NBC contamination as necessary to facilitate repair.
- Provide security for LOGCAP personnel IOT facilitate the rapid restoration of the Iraqi oil industry.
- O/O, transition CA activities to IO/NGO/HN.
- O/O, release TACON of Marine forces to MARCENT.
- SOCCENT selected forces remain TACON to CFLCC throughout PH IV operations.
- O/O, redeploy forces.
- BPT, support the reorganization of the Iraqi military IOT enable Iraq to maintain its territorial integrity.
- BPT, support destruction/transport of WMD munitions/delivery systems IOT maintain control of Iraqi WMD capabilities.
- O/O, transitions to CJTF-Iraq IOT facilitate redeployment.
- O/O, CFLCC expands ongoing stability operations to encompass all of IRAQ and establishes a sufficiently stable environment IOT create conditions for transition to CJTF-IRAQ and redeployment.

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CFLCC Assumptions



- Potential major non-GCC additional Coalition forces are not available until after 1 April due to port/flow limitations.
- Inter/intra factional fighting and terrorists groups represent the primary threat to CFLCC forces.
- Iraqi civil authorities will continue to run local and regional essential services.
- National and Coalition agencies will provide CFLCC with a Blacklist of Iraqi civil administration officials that CFLCC cannot use to keep key functions operating.
- CFLCC will not be the lead for major reconstruction efforts.
- IO/NGO's/CGA/UN will be major contributing factors for stability operations.
- All legislative, judicial, and executive authority powers in Iraq will be vested in COMCFC and exercised through COMCFLCC.
- Initially working to COMCFLCC, ORHA will lead on Civil Governance, HA and reconstruction efforts.
- Title 10 responsibilities will remain with ARCENT.

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CFLCC Mission

ECLIPSE II Base Order (Draft)




- O/O, CFLCC transitions battlefield framework and conducts stability operations throughout IRAQ IOT create a sufficiently stable environment for transition to CJTF-IRAQ and O/O redeploys designated forces .


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COMCFLCC Intent



- Purpose. To create a sufficiently stable environment to allow transition to follow-on-forces and the engagement of civil agencies to begin recovery.
- Key Tasks. Lead lies with CFLCC.
 - Build Iraqi, regional and international support through positively influencing the Iraqi populace, coalition, regional and world perception.
 - Establish a secure and stable environment within Iraq to permit CFLCC transition to CJTF-IRAQ.
 - Restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety.
 - Begin infrastructure recovery by initiating restoration of critical civil infrastructure.
 - Mitigate human suffering by enabling civilian engagement in Emergency Humanitarian Assistance (HA).
 - Provide governance and civil administration through the exercise of military authority.
 - Continue to locate and secure WMD and initiate disposal process.

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CFLCC Endstate



- CFLCC has established a sufficiently stable environment in which CFLCC has conducted battle handover to CJTF-IRAQ, recovered forces and completed redeployment.


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
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CFLCC STABILITY OPERATIONS	
Lines of Operation	Key Tasks
ACHIEVE IRAQI, REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT - Integrate and leverage Coalition efforts to establish a stable and secure environment within a self sufficient Iraqi nation.	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Support the theater information campaign plan• Promote unity of effort among Coalition partners• Encourage support for Coalition military authority• Effectively communicate essential messages
SECURITY Establish a secure and stable environment for CFLCC transition to CJTF-IRAQ.	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Complete the defeat of Iraqi military forces• Maintain the territorial integrity of Iraq• Locate, secure and document remaining WMD• Identify and detain terrorists and war criminals
RULE OF LAW - Exercise control through the existing legal system and operate in accordance with international law.	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Impose and maintain public order and safety.• Employ existing local and regional law enforcement• Dismantle former regime's internal security apparatus
INFRASTRUCTURE RECOVERY Initiate restoration of Iraqi self-sufficiency.	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Support the reestablishment of civil infrastructure• Assist IA-DARTs
HUMANITARIAN RELIEF AND ASSISTANCE - Mitigate human suffering.	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Provide emergency HA• Support sustainment HA provided by IO/NGOs• Control DC operations
GOVERNANCE AND ADMINISTRATION Exercise military authority.	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Exercise military authority through Iraqi civil authorities• Initiate use of Iraqi military for stability operations

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
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NOTE: Shown are the forces available for CFLCC to attack into IZ on LD Day (see definition on slide 5). The blue shaded forces will flow later IAW the TPFDD; and note that I MARDIV (-) (2 RCTs at LD DAY) will eventually become 1 MARDIV (+) with five RCTs. Note that CFLCC needs to wargame the KIRKUK Oilfields, but this slide indicates an 82nd Abn DRB (Div Ready Bde) or the 173rd AbnBde as *possible* options for KIRKUK. However, I say again CFLCC *must* wargame *KIRKUK*.

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CLFCC Concept (Stage I)



- Establish control of Tier 1 flashpoint towns (BAGHDAD, KIRKUK, MOSUL, KARBALA, AN NAJAF and AL BASRA).
- I MEF expands its AO and conducts relief in place of V Corps forces within its Stage II AO.
- V Corps expands its AO and receives OPCON of 4 ID.
- V Corps establishes TF 1.4a (101st AASLT DIV) and O/O transfers command to CFLCC.
- 82nd DRB provides a CFLCC reserve for SSE and security tasks throughout.
- O/O expand AOs to encompass all of IRAQ.
- O/O of COMCFSOCC, CFLCC receives TACON of designated CFSOCC forces.
- As soon as possible establish a presence in vicinity of Tier 2 flashpoint towns (DAHUK, SULAYMANIYAH, SAMARRA, IRBIL, TIKRIT and NASARIYAH).
- Focus on deterring both inter and intra factional fighting and territorial ambitions by neighbors that threaten the territorial integrity of IRAQ.
- Provide security to contract oil personnel restoring the Iraqi oilfield industry.
- On going SSE operations continue and expand to encompass all of IRAQ.
- Maintain law and order, assist IA-DARTs, clear essential life support infrastructure and oil infrastructure of obstacles that hamper repair, provide Emergency HA, and exercise military authority on a local and regional basis.

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CLFCC Concept (Stage II)



- CFLCC forces focus fully on stability operations throughout IRAQ.
- CFLCC concentrates on establishing a sufficiently secure and stable environment in IRAQ through a combination of presence in flashpoint areas and the employment of quick response forces at all levels.
- CFLCC forces continue with the tasks initiated in Stage I as required.
- CFLCC transitions the organizational lead for humanitarian relief, civil administration and reconstruction to the Organization of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA).
- As ORHA becomes more involved in these activities, CFLCC continues to provide military support, but focuses increasingly on security tasks and the Iraqi military.
- CFLCC is prepared to relieve like forces in theater and conduct JRSOI of inbound forces and redeployment of outbound forces.
- This Stage ends with COMCFLCC having established a sufficiently stable environment and informs COMCFC that he is ready to begin battle handover to CJTF-IRAQ.

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
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- In this stage, CFLCC initiates and completes battle handover of the mission to CJTF-IRAQ. CFLCC then preps forces for redeployment, moves forces to appropriate APODS and SPODS, and then conducts redeployment. Further Stage III details TBP

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
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
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
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
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
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Agenda


- What could a post hostilities Iraq look like?
- What are the flash points?
- What are the issues specific to the North and Kurdish Autonomous Zone (KAZ)?
- What are the most likely and dangerous COAs?

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Phase IV Environment Challenges




- Force Protection (terrorism, pockets of resistance, long LOCs)
- EPW (repatriation/reintegration)
- WMD/SSE (site control, removal, transport)
- Dislocated civilians (internal and external)
- Iraqi Military (demobilize and control)
- Kurdish Military (disarm?)
- Oil infrastructure triage (refineries, pipelines & storage)
- Separatist intentions (Kurds, Shia)
- Lawlessness (reprisals, crime)
- Humanitarian Assistance / Vital Infrastructure Repair
- New Government acceptance, "de-Saddamization"

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
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Post Hostilities Environment



• **A post-Saddam government in Iraq will face challenges in maintaining internal order and security.**

- In northern Iraq, challenges will be linked with the region's Kurdish population and desire for independence.
- Reprisals (at least near term) will be inevitable (related to previous regime actions).
- A general climate of insecurity, in which many weapons will remain in Iraqi citizens' hands.
- Acceptance of government legitimacy by internal influencers (tribal, religious, ethnic) – a potential Power Vacuum
- On the regional level, the capabilities and intentions of other states in the region

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- There will be a significant hostile intelligence service threat to post-Saddam Iraq from most countries in the region.
- Terrorist organizations WILL exploit the unstable environment and target US interests.
- Probable destruction of Saddam-era archives will make basic government functions difficult (determining ownership, legal status, legitimacy of claims, etc). Will also make recruiting a "Saddam Free" new government virtually impossible.


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Post Hostilities Environment

- **Postwar ethnic and sectarian issues in Northern Iraq will be dominated by the area's Kurdish majority.**
 - Kurdish Nationalist desires...at a minimum continued autonomy, maybe Independence.
 - A major security concern will be the extent to which the Kurdish resistance groups can be disarmed.
 - Border control, especially in Kurdish regions, will be a major challenge to a postwar regime's security forces.
 - Some Kurdish elements may resist central government attempts to reintegrate their economic activities into a national system.
 - Environmental concerns in the North will focus on the impact of damage to the region's oilfields, which would compound the humanitarian situation there.
 - The KAZ is an intersection "culture and interests" for 4 countries and is potential "Flash Point"


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Post Hostilities Environment

•Postwar security concerns involving the selection and vetting of new government personnel and key leaders.

- Saddam-era intelligence and security personnel will attempt to evade postwar justice, and may attempt to "reinvent" themselves if they remain in the country.
- Probable destruction of archives / records will make this possible.
- Organized crime by Saddam-era personnel (to include Tikriti and Duri tribes) could develop as a problem in a postwar Iraq.
- Some (IIS, SSO, etc) could transform and become agents for a foreign intelligence service or terrorist organization (think former "jobless" KGB, STASI agents). WMD smuggling?
- Rebuilding the security forces, as well as assisting humanitarian agencies in hiring trusted personnel, will be a major postwar challenge.

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Post Hostilities Environment



•A new political class in postwar Iraq will likely be more diverse than that under Saddam, but will only come to be with a degree of turmoil.

- No history of democracy, 70% of population only have Saddam as a frame of reference. No tradition of other balancing power sources in country (media, free speech, independent judicial system, representative bodies, special interests).
- The role of exiles, their acceptance by Iraqis, remains an uncertain factor.
- Ensuring an expanded elite with Kurdish and Shi'a membership will have potential difficulties after decades of Sunni dominance.
- A major threat to postwar stability lies in the possibility that some new political parties could identify exclusively with a given ethnic or sectarian group.
- Reprisals against Saddam-era officials and sympathizers will threaten the rule of law and postwar reconciliation efforts.
- Role of religious leaders in Shia areas, Sunni intelligentsia and an educated middle class – all will emerge and can be potential stabilizers.

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Post Hostilities Environment




• A postwar administration in Iraq will face challenges in gaining the support of the population, ensuring restoration and expansion of services, repairing war damage, and ensuring the rule of law. Major humanitarian and environmental concerns will be an unavoidable part of post-Saddam Iraq

- Extent of infrastructure damage???
- Baath Party personnel will be needed to run Provinces/bureaucracy.
- Emigration in the postwar era will continue and may increase (Brain Drain).
- Humanitarian needs will surface before hostilities end, and involve refugees, internally displaced, and Iraqis currently dependent on the regime for food and other necessities.
- Environmental concerns in the North will focus on the impact of damage to the region's oilfields, which would compound the humanitarian situation there.
- "Right of return" issues for formerly displaced Kurds, Turkmen, Shia, etc will quickly become an issue.
- Oil for food program key to large part of subsistence, especially in the KAZ.

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
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Kurdish Autonomous Zone

- Overview
- Players
- Capabilities
- Interests and Flash Points

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Why the Kurdish Problem?


- Post WWI division of Ottoman Empire, discovery of oil in Mosul, retention of territory by British.
- The “Domino Effect” of Independence - Kurdish Independence will have destabilizing effects on 4 countries
- Any action that gives political or economic viability to a “Kurdistan” will cause reaction by all four – with Turkey being the most direct.
- Oil fields can provide that needed economic viability
- Kirkuk and Mosul have very large, recently displaced Kurdish populations that WILL return.
- Kurds have done well the last decade, will not want to lose what they have gained.
- Border control, thriving trade, standing army...may resist reintegration
- Ultimate survivors, most likely will adapt to conditions, comply with US directives



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Key Kurdish Leaders



Massoud Barzani (KDP)

- Founded 1946, anti-regime
- Secular, goal is Kurdish Independence
- Tribal, urban based
- Shifting allegiances for short term goals
- Suspicious of US (perceptions of inconsistency)
- est 45,000 light fighters



As of 271/0002 DEC 02




Jalal Talabani (PUK)

- Founded 1976, split from KDP
- Secular, goal is Kurdish Independence
- Tribal, urban based
- Major rival of KDP
- est 25,000 light fighters
- in conflict with Ansar al Islam (AI)

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
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
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Who are the Kurdish PESHMERGA?	
(b)(6)	<p>~ 75,000 armed fighters between PUK and KDP</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">•Light Infantry•Limited Mobility•Plt - Co level competency•Minimal heavy weapons•Tough mountain fighters•Military academies, British Style – Tradition of strong leaders•Special Forces are capable
<p>CONFIDENTIAL REL TO USA, FIA, GRR, and GER DERIVED FROM: DO HUMINT SCG, MAR 02 DECLASSIFY ON: X1</p>	
<p>UNCLASSIFIED</p>  <p>(b)(6)</p> <p>Kurd Military Use of Toyota Pickups</p>	<p>Typical Peshmerga Compared to Special Forces</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">•Opportunistic Fighters Better at defense than offense•Secular martyrdom. Given their history of oppression, the Kurds celebrate resistance against insurmountable odds, from the fatalistic meaning of the very word peshmerga, "one who faces death," to their common sayings "A male is born to be slaughtered" or "fighting is better than idleness."•Mossad trainer claimed: "Put a Kurd atop a mountain with a rifle, pita bread, and onions, and he'll stop a whole column of troops for you."•Will we have to disarm them???

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<div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between; align-items: center;"> V <h2 style="margin: 0;">Interests and Flash Points</h2> </div>		
Turkey	Kurds	US
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Economic Viability •No Kurdish State •Stable Central IZ Govt •Access to Oil •Destroy KADEK (PKK) •Protect Turkomans 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Economic viability, profit from oil •Autonomy, voice in Govt, perhaps independence •Protect Kurd rights/interests •Reverse Arabization •Expand political boundaries 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Regime Change •Support New Govt •Destroy WMD •Territorial Integrity •Transition to International Orgs
<div style="display: flex; align-items: center;"> <div style="background-color: red; color: white; padding: 5px; margin-right: 10px; transform: rotate(45deg); transform-origin: center;"> RED LINES </div> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Kurdish Moves on Oil •Attack Turkomans •Kurdish Independence •Support for KADEK </div>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Turks move south toward Irbil/Mosul/Kirkuk •Long term Turkish occupation •Kurdish persecution 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Crossing any Red Line by either Turks/Kurds •Existence of Ansar al Islam

“Turk – Kurd Reality Check”
Mutual distrust and high stakes increase likelihood of miscalculations and preemptive action – they are suspicious and paranoid of each others’ intentions.

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
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
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
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- The northern oil producing region is approximately 600 sq miles in size.
- Kirkuk oilfield approx 250 sq miles
- Northern Production capacity: <1 million barrels per day
- High concentration of hydrogen sulfide associated with crude oil; Will require self-breathing apparatus if necessary to extinguish or cap wells
- These wells are the most difficult in IZ to firefight and extinguish because of the pressure and H₂S.
- Extinguishing time will last roughly 2-3 weeks per well.
- Wells in the north are for the most part placed in deep concrete "cellars" because they are deep wells and will have a relatively large wellhead with valves....
- The deep cellars make capping a well difficult because of the problems getting to the sub-surface well casing
- Supports O-F-F exports and Illegal exports to Turkey

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
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- Northern oil producing region is approximately 600 sq miles in size.
- Kirkuk oilfield approx 250 sq miles
- Northern production capacity: ~900,000 barrels per day
- High concentration of hydrogen sulfide gas associated with crude oil; will require self-breathing apparatus if necessary to extinguish or cap wells
- These wells are the most difficult in IZ to firefight and extinguish because of the pressure and H2S.
- Extinguishing time will last roughly 2-3 weeks per well.
- Wells in the north are for the most part placed in deep concrete "cellars" because they are deep wells and will have a relatively large wellhead with valves....
- The deep cellars make capping a well difficult because of the problems getting to the sub-surface well casing
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
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Internal Response and Perceptions		SECRET//ORCON, REL USA, AUS and GBR//X1	
Major Post-Saddam Issues	Sunnis	Shias	Kurds
Ouster of Saddam	Mixed. Some benefited from regime and most fear loss Sunni predominance or being targets of revenge killings.	Support. Most oppressed sector of Iraq society under Saddam	Mixed. Some benefited from regime and most fear loss Sunni predominance or being targets of revenge killings.
Score-settling and war crimes trials	Oppose. Major fear of score-settling against former regime officials	Support. May engage in revenge killings against Baath and regime officials. Will demand war crimes trials.	Support. May engage in ethnic cleansing of Arab, Turkmen in Kirkuk area. Demand war crimes trials.
Lack of dominant role in new political order	Oppose. Intense fear of losing control of political and military institution, concern Shia will take over Iraq, Kurds separate	Oppose. Anticipate political weight comparable to demographic weight	Mixed. In short term want to keep current autonomy. Expect proportional, not dominant, role in central government. Long term goal?
Giving external opposition major political role	Oppose. Hostility for abandoning Iraq, riding American coat-tails, pushing un-Iraq notions (democracy)	Mixed. Suspicious of foreign influence, particularly from Iran on SCIRI and the US on INC, INA	Mixed. Have worked extensively with external opposition
Maintaining territorial unity of Iraq	Support. Sunni-dominated, centralized state is Sunni ideal type for Iraq	Support. But want greater decentralization, federalism. Reject separate Shia Arab state	Support. Accept as a current political necessity. Maintain long-term aspirations for independence.
US-led occupation	Oppose. Probably prefer brief, UN-led process that leaves Iraq's political contours relatively undisturbed.	Mixed. Suspicion of US clashes with possible benefits from US-led occupation that might reshape politics & give Shia chance to acquire power	Support. Long-term relationship with Washington increases chances for political influence.
Introduction of democracy	Oppose. See one man one vote potential dangerous to continued Sunni predominance	Support. See as ticket for international legitimacy and Shia empowerment	Support. Want to extend democratic practices in Kurdistan to the rest of Iraq, in context of federalism and autonomy.
Destruction of WMD & compliance with UNSCRs	Oppose. Reluctant to destroy WMD because of regional threats (Israel, Iran)	Support. Accept WMD destruction and compliance with UNSCRs	Support. Accept WMD destruction and compliance with UNSCRs
Military reorganization	Support. Reduction in size and strength of military/security forces seen as blow to traditional Sunni stronghold and weakening Iraq vis-à-vis Iran	Support. Advocate military with greater Shia presence	Support. But reluctant to demobilize or disarm Kurdish militia. May accept integration with new, reformed Iraq army
Short-term economic expectations	Immediate lifting of sanctions and resumption of oil flow with economic decision making and resources controlled by Sunni-dominated central government	Immediate lifting of sanctions and redirection of oil revenue to Shia areas	Retain current 13 percent Oil-for-Food revenues. Decentralize economic decision making, increase share of oil revenue

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Initial Threat COAs

MOST LIKELY

- Asymmetric Threat with pockets of continued resistance.
- Increase in HOIS, outside terrorist organizations targeting US interests
- Short term reprisals against Saddam era officials, score settling between faction.
- Short term factional violence, especially against key Sunni Tribe (Duri and Tikriti)
- Former Saddam era apparatus reinventing roles, resorting to organized crime, working for external groups (intelligence, terrorism)
- Unrest due to return of Kurdish / Turkoman displaced persons in North
- Kurds attempting to maximize political gain short of declaring independence or gaining territory
- Initial power vacuum as ethnic / religious groups seek to gain or retain influence in new government.

MOST DANGEROUS

- Conditions in the North (Kurd uprising, violence as displaced Kurds return to homes) result in Kurdish Forces occupying Mosul or Kirkuk.
- Turkish Forces react and invade.
- Area is fractured, conditions deteriorate, large DC flow, Turkish border blocked

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
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Constraints

Legal Constraints in Combat

- FOLLOW LAW OF WAR
- DO NOT TARGET CIVILIANS
- AVOID CIVILIANS, IF POSSIBLE
- IF CIVILIAN CONTACT
 - TREAT HUMANELY
 - MINIMIZE INTERFERENCE WITH OPNS
 - DCAA/DCC THRESHOLD (DCG)
 - HDR THRESHOLD (DCG)
- ROE AUTHORITY FOR CIVILIANS
 - HOSTILE ACT/ HOSTILE INTENT
 - GRADUATED FORCE
 - STOP SERIOUS VIOLENCE
 - DETENTION AUTHORIZED

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Constraints


Legal Constraints in Post Hostilities

- FOLLOW LAW OF WAR
- FOURTH GENEVA ("CIVILIANS") CONVENTION APPLIES AS AREAS COME UNDER EFFECTIVE CONTROL
- LIMITED MILITARY ADMINISTRATION BEGINS
 - NO PROCLAMATION NECESSARY
 - INHERENT AUTHORITY OF COMMANDER
 - KEY TASKS
 - MAINTAIN ORDER
 - RESTORE ESSENTIAL PUBLIC WORKS


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Constraints

Legal Constraints in Post Hostilities

- **FOLLOW LAW OF WAR**
- **FOLLOW FOURTH GENEVA CONVENTION**
- **ISSUE COALITION PROCLAMATION**
 - NOT LEGALLY REQUIRED
 - RIGHTS, DUTIES OF OCCUPIER EXIST REGARDLESS OF PROCLAMATION -OR USE OF "O WORD"
- **ISSUE INSTRUCTIONS TO IZ PEOPLE**
 - G.O. #1 FOR CIVILIANS
 - CURFEWS, STAY-PUT POLICIES, OFFENSES AGAINST COALITION FORCES
- **ISSUE INSTRUCTIONS TO IZ MILITARY**
- **SURRENDER DOCUMENT?**

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Constraints



Legal Constraints in Post Hostilities

- **CIVIL ADMINISTRATION BEGINS**
 - HEAVY CA/CMO EXPERTISE REQUIRES
 - USAID (DART), DOS INVOLVEMENT
- **PUT LOCAL POLICE, COURTS, GOVT. STRUCTURE UNDER U.S. MILITARY CONTROL**
- **IMPLEMENT DETENTION CRITERIA AND REVIEW STANDARDS**
 - MILITARY NECESSITY
 - MINIMUM DUE PROCESS
 - MILITARY DETENTION FACILITIES
 - CAN USE IZ FACILITY UNDER U.S. CONTROL
- **COURTS**
 - IZ COURTS POLITICIZED
 - CAN USE COURTS CREATED UNDER CIVIL ADMINISTRATION
 - CAN USE COURTS AUTHORIZED IN UCMJ, ART. 21

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Constraints



Legal Constraints in Post Hostilities


- **COURTS (cont'd)**
 - COURTS-MARTIAL
 - PROVOST COURTS
 - MILITARY COMMISSIONS
 - FOURTH GENEVA CONVENTION REQUIRES USE OF IZ LAW UNLESS A THREAT TO SECURITY OR INCONSISTENT WITH CONVENTION (ARTICLE 64, GC)
 - MUST PUBLISH ANY ADDITIONAL PENAL PROVISIONS (ARTICLE 65, GC)
 - FOLLOW "GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW" (GC ARTICLE 67)
 - MINIMUM DUE PROCESS
 - PUNISHMENT PROPORTIONATE WITH OFFENSE
 - RIGHT OF APPEAL

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The Legal Environment




- **"FIRST OFF, LET'S KILL ALL THE LAWYERS..."**
 - SADDAM REMOVED LAWYERS FROM JUDICIARY
 - REPLACED WITH BA'ATH PARTY MEMBERS
- **CIVIL AND CRIMINAL SYSTEM**
- **SECURITY OFFENSES**


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
Conclusion

- Must continue mission analysis
 - Receive a mission
 - Analyse troops to task
 - Must identify the “leverage points” and provide focus....
- COA development:
 - Initial focus on transition

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CG Guidance

1 of 2




- "I am not hung up on the 101st for TF 1.4a"
 - "I am hung up on having a flexible force"
 - CG does think that the area involved and forces required implies some type of aviation/air assault capability
 - This may be the 101st (-)
- Must identify the conditions for transition
 - How do we transition to Phase IV B Stage I? Where do we want to be and what do we want to look like?
- Agreed with our initial focus on transition:
 - We must go into this thing knowing how we're going to transition ourselves to Phase IV B
- Priority for planning and transition tasks (note: CG stated tasks...*I've added purple*)
 - 1) Control Baghdad *IOT allow a handover of the Baghdad AO to CFLCC*
 - 2) Reset our logistics *IOT allow the establishment of a Corps' sustainment structure in the new AO*
 - 3) Secure the KIRKUK oilfields *IOT promote local stability and allow long-term economic viability to the new Government*


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CG Guidance




2 of 2

- "Priority for planning and transition tasks (note: CG stated tasks...*I've added purple*)(cont.)
 - 4) Establish a presence in MOSUL and IRBIL *IOT promote a stable and secure environment in Northern IRAQ*
 - 5) Contain non-compliant IRAQI forces *IOT deny their ability to pose a threat to our forces or the new Government*
 - 6) Secure suspected WMD sites w/in our AO *IOT allow their exploitation*
- Other guidance:
 - Western Desert = Economy of force
 - Analyse how we control border crossings
 - Sustainment: ID airfields we can use (would be nice if CFACC could control them) and ID GLOCs (through Turkey?)


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Battlestaff Planning Guidance



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- Continue to update staff estimates (forces available and BOS specified tasks) based on:
 - Forces available 1 April
 - Tasks as outlined in ECLIPSE II Draft Base
- Review the following NLT 03 2000 Mar
 - Transition endstate
 - Mnvr Transition Tasks and concept(s)
 - Posted in Phase IV B folder in “COA Development”
- Identify the following NLT 04 1200 Mar
 - BOS supporting transition tasks based on this concept
- *Group review/group COA development TBD 4 March*

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