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

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

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

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Current Phase IV B Planning Status

- CFLCC Change 2 to OPLAN 1003 V
  - Dtd 15 February 2003
  - Additional requirements for Phase IV B/CMO instructions for Phase III C/IV A
- CFLCC Planning Order Change 3
  - Dtd 18 February 2003
  - Directed production of a sequel plan for OPLAN 1003V
- CFLCC CONPLAN ECLIPSE II
  - Draft dtd 1 March 2003
- *Base plan release TBD*

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

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

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CFLCC Assumptions

- Potential major non-GCC additional Coalition forces are not available until after 1 April due to port/flow limitations.
- Inter/intra factional fighting and terrorists groups represent the primary threat to CFLCC forces.
- Iraqi civil authorities will continue to run local and regional essential services.
- National and Coalition agencies will provide CFLCC with a Blacklist of Iraqi civil administration officials that CFLCC cannot use to keep key functions operating.
- CFLCC will not be the lead for major reconstruction efforts.
- IO/NGO's/CGA/UN will be major contributing factors for stability operations.
- All legislative, judicial, and executive authority powers in Iraq will be vested in COMCFC and exercised through COMCFLCC.
- Initially working to COMCFLCC, ORHA will lead on Civil Governance, HA and reconstruction efforts.
- Title 10 responsibilities will remain with ARCENT.

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

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

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

NOTE: Shown are the forces available for CFLCC to attack into IZ on LD Day (see definition on slide 5). The blue shaded forces will flow later IAW the TPFDD; and note that I MARDIV (-) (2 RCTs at LD DAY) will eventually become 1 MARDIV (+) with five RCTs. Note that CFLCC needs to wargame the KIRKUK Oilfields, but this slide indicates an 82nd Abn DRB (Div Ready Bde) or the 173rd AbnBde as *possible* options for KIRKUK. However, I say again CFLCC *must wargame KIRKUK.*

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

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V CLFCC Concept (Stage I)

- Establish control of Tier 1 flashpoint towns (BAGHDAD, KIRKUK, MOSUL, KARBALA, AN NAJAF and AL BASRA).
- I MEF expands its AO and conducts relief in place of V Corps forces within its Stage II AO.
- V Corps expands its AO and receives OPCON of 4 ID.
- V Corps establishes TF 1.4a (101st AASLTDIV) and O/O transfers command to CFLCC.
- 82nd DRB provides a CFLCC reserve for SSE and security tasks throughout.
- O/O expand AOs to encompass all of IRAQ.
- O/O of COMCFSOCC, CFLCC receives TACON of designated CFSOCC forces.
- As soon as possible establish a presence in vicinity of Tier 2 flashpoint towns (DAHUK, SULAYMANIYAH, SAMARRA, IRBIL, TIKRIT and NASARIYAH).
- Focus on deterring both inter and intra factional fighting and territorial ambitions by neighbors that threaten the territorial integrity of IRAQ.
- Provide security to contract oil personnel restoring the Iraqi oilfield industry.
- On going SSE operations continue and expand to encompass all of IRAQ.
- Maintain law and order, assist IA-DARTs, clear essential life support infrastructure and oil infrastructure of obstacles that hamper repair, provide Emergency HA, and exercise military authority on a local and regional basis.

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CLFCC Concept (Stage II)

- CFLCC forces focus fully on stability operations throughout IRAQ.
- CFLCC concentrates on establishing a sufficiently secure and stable environment in IRAQ through a combination of presence in flashpoint areas and the employment of quick response forces at all levels.
- CFLCC forces continue with the tasks initiated in Stage I as required.
- CFLCC transitions the organizational lead for humanitarian relief, civil administration and reconstruction to the Organization of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA).
- As ORHA becomes more involved in these activities, CFLCC continues to provide military support, but focuses increasingly on security tasks and the Iraqi military.
- CFLCC is prepared to relieve like forces in theater and conduct JRSOI of inbound forces and redeployment of outbound forces.
- This Stage ends with COMCFLCC having established a sufficiently stable environment and informs COMCFC that he is ready to begin battle handover to CJTF-IRAQ.

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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Threat

- **Threat to US / Coalition forces**
  - Asymmetric attacks (soft targets on LOCs / LSAs)
  - Remnants of SRG / SSO / "hard cores"
  - Continued SSE
  - Indirect (unrest / smuggling / crime)
  - Influx of terrorists / Hostile Intelligence
- **Threat to post-regime govt**
  - Ethnic strife / fracturing
  - Control of oilfields / infrastructure
  - Lack of support from the local population
- **Threat from outside sources**
  - Turkey: Possible intervention if Kurds move on Mosul or Kirkuk

1.4b



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Post Hostilities Environment

- **A post-Saddam government in Iraq will face challenges in maintaining internal order and security.**
  - In northern Iraq, challenges will be linked with the region's Kurdish population and desire for independence.
  - Reprisals (at least near term) will be inevitable (related to previous regime actions).
  - A general climate of insecurity, in which many weapons will remain in Iraqi citizens' hands.
  - Acceptance of government legitimacy by internal influencers (tribal, religious, ethnic) – a potential Power Vacuum
  - On the regional level, the capabilities and intentions of other states in the region 1.4b 1.4b
  - There will be a significant hostile intelligence service threat to post-Saddam Iraq from most countries in the region.
  - Terrorist organizations WILL exploit the unstable environment and target US interests.
  - Probable destruction of Saddam-era archives will make basic government functions difficult (determining ownership, legal status, legitimacy of claims, etc). Will also make recruiting a "Saddam Free" new government virtually impossible.

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Post Hostilities Environment

- **Postwar ethnic and sectarian issues in Northern Iraq will be dominated by the area's Kurdish majority.**
  - Kurdish Nationalist desires…at a minimum continued autonomy, maybe Independence.
  - A major security concern will be the extent to which the Kurdish resistance groups can be disarmed.
  - Border control, especially in Kurdish regions, will be a major challenge to a postwar regime's security forces.
  - Some Kurdish elements may resist central government attempts to reintegrate their economic activities into a national system.
  - Environmental concerns in the North will focus on the impact of damage to the region's oilfields, which would compound the humanitarian situation there.
  - The KAZ is an intersection "culture and interests" for 4 countries and is potential "Flash Point"

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

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

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

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Post Hostilities Environment

•A postwar administration in Iraq will face challenges in gaining the support of the population, ensuring restoration and expansion of services, repairing war damage, and ensuring the rule of law. Major humanitarian and environmental concerns will be an unavoidable part of post-Saddam Iraq

- Extent of infrastructure damage???
- Baath Party personnel will be needed to run Provinces/bureaucracy.
- Emigration in the postwar era will continue and may increase (Brain Drain).
- Humanitarian needs will surface before hostilities end, and involve refugees, internally displaced, and Iraqis currently dependent on the regime for food and other necessities.
- Environmental concerns in the North will focus on the impact of damage to the region's oilfields, which would compound the humanitarian situation there.
- "Right of return" issues for formerly displaced Kurds, Turkmen, Shia, etc will quickly become an issue.
- Oil for food program key to large part of subsistence, especially in the KAZ.

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Post Hostilities Environment

Religious Issues

- Not a major factor in north, secular tradition…***"compared to an unbeliever, a Kurd is a good Muslim"*** *(Kurdish saying)*
- Some changes in Kurdish youth, Wahbi clerics having some effect in areas.
- In south, Shia attitudes will be shaped by respect for their religion and religious cities. Will initially support coalition, but must see an endstate.
- 1.4b will attempt to influence Arab Shia, with mixed results.

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Post Hostilities Environment



Demographic Issues.

- Median age 19, restless youth…"impatient for change?"
- For majority, frame of reference is "Saddam Era" – nothing else known
- No tradition of participatory politics / democracy…fragment or cooperate?
- Strong middle class (regional perspective)
- Well educated (regional perspective)
- KAZ economically advanced compared to rest of IZ (cell phones, internet cafes, trade)
- Shia, Sunni and Kurds have traditionally lived peacefully together

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

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Why the Kurdish Problem?

- Post WWI division of Ottoman Empire, discovery of oil in Mosul, retention of territory by British.
- The "Domino Effect" of Independence - Kurdish Independence will have destabilizing effects on 4 countries
- Any action that gives political or economic viability to a "Kurdistan" will cause reaction by all four – with Turkey being the most direct.
- Oil fields can provide that needed economic viability
- Kirkuk and Mosul have very large, recently displaced Kurdish populations that WILL return.
- Kurds have done well the last decade, will not want to lose what they have gained.
- Border control, thriving trade, standing army…may resist reintegration
- Ultimate survivors, most likely will adapt to conditions, comply with US directives

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

- Tier 1 **(red)** and Tier 2 **(green)** locations identified by CFLCC are key historical, economic and political centers along LOCs that dominate the rugged north.

- Area dominated by commercial life separate from rest of country, smuggling, illegal border crossings and entrenched local, tribal interests

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Key Kurdish Leaders

Massoud Barzani (KDP)



Jalal Talabani (PUK)

- Founded 1946, anti-regime
- Secular, goal is Kurdish Independence
- Tribal, urban based
- Shifting allegiances for short term goals
- Suspicious of US (perceptions of inconsistency)
- est 45,000 light fighters

- Founded 1976, split from KDP
- Secular, goal is Kurdish Independence
- Tribal, urban based
- Major rival of KDP
- est 25,000 light fighters
- in conflict with Ansar al Islam (AI)

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

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Significance Of Kirkuk

UNCLASSIFIED

View of Kirkuk

- Oil Fields ~ 800,000 brls/day.
- Saddam's Arabization Program displaced an estimated 100,000 Kirkuki Kurds. Many displaced to the "Iron Polygon".
- KDP's Barzani "we have fought 10 years for autonomy, we'll fight another for Kirkuk". PUK less vocal.
- Post war mass population move of Kurds and some Turkoman very likely. Potential for violence and Kurd reaction.
- Makes an independent Kurdistan economically viable



MLCOA: Kurds respect US desire for restraint (US pressure)

MDCOA:
1. Mass return of displaced Kurds, violence ensues, Kurd forces enter to prevent massacres (reported KDP CONPLAN)
2. Local Kurd uprising as IZ forces disintegrate (eg 1991)
3. Deliberate seizure

Kurd Maximal 1970 Demands (Yellow) Compared to Current Autonomous Region (Green)

~~SECRET/ORCON REL US UK AND AUS~~

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Significance Of Mosul

- Oil Storage/refinery facilities, major population center and potential economic "hub" for Northern Iraq (or a Kurdistan).
- Saddam's Arabization Program displaced Kurds and Turkomen
- Kurdish rhetoric varies on Mosul over years
- Turkish rhetoric "plays up" Kurdish intent to occupy



Kurd Maximal 1970 Demands (Yellow) Compared to Current Autonomous Region (Green)

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Who are the Kurdish PESHMERGA?

(b)(6)

~ 75,000 armed fighters between PUK and KDP

- Light Infantry
- Limited Mobility
- Plt - Co level competency
- Minimal heavy weapons
- Tough mountain fighters
- Military academies, British Style – Tradition of strong leaders
- Special Forces are capable
- Opportunistic Fighters

Better at defense than offense

(b)(6)

Typical Peshmerga Compared to Special Force

CONFIDENTIAL//REL TO USA, FRA, GBR, and GER
DERIVED FROM: DO HUMINT SCG, MAR 02
DECLASSIFY ON: X1

UNCLASSIFIED

(b)(6)

Kurd Military Use of Toyota Pickups

- **Secular martyrdom.** Given their history of oppression, the Kurds celebrate resistance against insurmountable odds, from the fatalistic meaning of the very word peshmerga, "one who faces death," to their common sayings "A male is born to be slaughtered" or "fighting is better than idleness.

- **Mossad trainer claimed:**

"Put a Kurd atop a mountain with a rifle, pita bread, and onions, and he'll stop a whole column of troops for you."

- **Will we have to disarm them????**

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

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~~SECRET NOFORN~~

Are the Turks Serious? Yes!

- **OPERATION UNDAUNTED (KADEK/PKK)**
- **OPERATION RAIN (40 DC Camps S of border)**
- **OPERATION CARTRIDGE 1 (5x BCT Task Force: Protect Turkomans in IRBIL, Iraqi Turkoman Front)**
- **OPERATION CARTRIDGE 2 (Seize Mosul and Kirkuk)**

Effects of Latter Operations on US
- Lose the IO war in North
- Balkanization / fractured
- Iranian reaction
- HA / DCs, "scorched earth"
- US force protection concerns



Kurd Maximal 1970 Demands (Yellow) Compared to Current Autonomous Region (Green)

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V Are the Kurds Serious? Probably not, but...

- **Mostly Rhetoric**
- **Kurds are pragmatic, will seek best advantage**
- **Probably understand how Turks will react**
- **But events could spin out of control quickly…like 1991**
  - Iraqi Green Line Collapse
  - Local Kurdish Uprising
  - Return of Displaced Kurds
  - Unacceptable violence

Effects of Latter Operations on US
- Lose the IO war in North
- Fractured / violence
- Turkish reaction
- Iranian reaction
- HA / DCs, "scorched earth – oil"
- US force protection concerns



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

- The northern oil producing region is approximately 600 sq miles in size.
- Kirkuk oilfield approx 250 sq miles
- Northern Production capacity: <1 million barrels per day
- High concentration of hydrogen sulfide associated with crude oil; Will require self-breathing apparatus if necessary to extinguish or cap wells
- These wells are the most difficult in IZ to firefight and extinguish because of the pressure and H2S.
- Extinguishing time will last roughly 2-3 weeks per well.
- Wells in the north are for the most part placed in deep concrete "cellars" because they are deep wells and will have a relatively large wellhead with valves….
- The deep cellars make capping a well difficult because of the problems getting to the sub-surface well casing
- Supports O-F-F exports and Illegal exports to Turkey

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

- Northern oil producing region is approximately 600 sq miles in size.
- Kirkuk oilfield approx 250 sq miles
- Northern production capacity: ~900,000 barrels per day
- High concentration of hydrogen sulfide gas associated with crude oil; will require self-breathing apparatus if necessary to extinguish or cap wells
- These wells are the most difficult in IZ to firefight and extinguish because of the pressure and H2S.
- Extinguishing time will last roughly 2-3 weeks per well.
- Wells in the north are for the most part placed in deep concrete "cellars" because they are deep wells and will have a relatively large wellhead with valves....
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

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

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Internal Response and Perceptions

~~SECRET//ORCON, REL USA, AUS and GBR//X1~~

Major Post-Saddam Issues	Sunnis	Shias	Kurds
Ouster of Saddam	**Mixed**. Some benefited from regime and most fear loss Sunni predominance or being targets of revenge killings	**Support.** Most oppressed sector of Iraq society under Saddam	**Mixed**. Some benefited from regime and most fear loss Sunni predominance or being targets of revenge killings
Score-settling and war crimes trials	**Oppose.** Major fear of score-settling against former regime officials	**Support.** May engage in revenge killings against Baath and regime officials . Will demand w ar crimes trials.	**Support**. May engage in ethnic cleansing of Arab, Turkmen in Kirkuk area. Demand w ar crimes trials.
Lack of dominant role in new political order	**Oppose.** Intense fear of losing control of political and military institution, concern Shia w ill take over Iraq, Kurds separate	**Oppose.** Anticipate political w eight comparable to demographic w eight	**Mixed.** In short term w ant to keep current autonomy. Expect proportional, not dominant, role in central government. Long term goal?
Giving external opposition major political role	**Oppose.** Hostility for abandoning Iraq, riding American coat-tails, pushing un-Iraq notions (democracy)	**Mixed.** Suspicious of foreign influence, particularly from Iran on SCIRI and the US on INC, INA	**Mixed.** Have w orked extensively w ith external opposition
Maintaining territorial unity of Iraq	**Support.** Sunni-dominated, centralized state is Sunni ideal type for Iraq	**Support.** But w ant greater decentralization, federalism. Reject separate Shia Arab state	**Support.** Accept as a current political necessity. Maintain long-term aspirations for independence.
US-led occupation	**Oppose.** Probably prefer brief, UN-led process that leaves Iraqis political contours relatively undisturbed.	**Mixed.** Suspicion of US clashes w ith possible benefits from US-led occupation that might reshape politics & give Shia chance to acquire pow er	**Support.** Long-term relationship w th Washington increases chances for political influence.
Introduction of democracy	**Oppose.** See one man one vote potential dangerous to continued Sunni predominance	**Support.** See as ticket for international legitimacy and Shia empow erment	**Support.** Want to extend democratic practices in Kurdistan to the rest of Iraq, in context of federalism and autonomy.
Destruction of WMD & compliance with UNSCRs	**Oppose.** Reluctant to destroy WMD because of regional threats (Israel, Iran)	**Support.** Accept WMD destruction and compliance w ith UNSCRs	**Support.** Accept WMD destruction and compliance w th UNSCRs
Military reorganization	**Support.** Reduction in size and strength of military/security forces seen as blow to traditional Sunni stronghold and w eakening Iraq vis-à-vis Iran	**Support.** Advocate military w ith greater Shia presence	**Support.** But reluctant to demobilize or disarm Kurdish militia. May accept integration w ith new , reformed Iraq army
Short-term economic expectations	Immediate lifting of sanctions and resumption oil ow e w ith economic decision making and resources controlled by Sunni-dominated central government	Immediate lifting of sanctions and redirection of oil revenue to Shia areas	Retain current 13 percent Oil-for-Food revenues. Decentralize economic decision making, increase share of oil revenue

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Initial Threat COAs

MOST LIKELY

- Asymmetric Threat with pockets of continued resistance.
- Increase in HOIS, outside terrorist organizations targeting US interests
- Short term reprisals against Saddam era officials, score settling between faction.
- Short term factional violence, especially against key Sunni Tribe (Duri and Tikriti)
- Former Saddam era apparatus reinventing roles, resorting to organized crime, working for external groups (intelligence, terrorism)
- Unrest due to return of Kurdish / Turkoman displaced persons in North
- Kurds attempting to maximize political gain short of declaring independence or gaining territory
- Initial power vacuum as ethnic / religious groups seek to gain or retain influence in new government.

MOST DANGEROUS

- Conditions in the North (Kurd uprising, violence as displaced Kurds return to homes) result in Kurdish Forces occupying Mosul or Kirkuk.
- Turkish Forces react and invade.
- Area is fractured, conditions deteriorate, large DC flow, Turkish border blocked

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

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Constraints

Legal Constraints in Post Hostilities

- **CIVIL ADMINISTRATION BEGINS**
  - HEAVY CA/CMO EXPERTISE REQUIRES
  - USAID (DART), DOS INVOLVEMENT
- **PUT LOCAL POLICE, COURTS, GOVT. STRUCTURE UNDER U.S. MILITARY CONTROL**
- **IMPLEMENT DETENTION CRITERIA AND REVIEW STANDARDS**
  - MILITARY NECESSITY
  - MINIMUM DUE PROCESS
  - MILITARY DETENTION FACILITIES
    - CAN USE IZ FACILITY UNDER U.S. CONTROL
- **COURTS**
  - IZ COURTS POLITICIZED
  - CAN USE COURTS CREATED UNDER CIVIL ADMINISTRATION
  - CAN USE COURTS AUTHORIZED IN UCMJ, ART. 21

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

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

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CG Guidance

1 of 2

- "I am not hung up on the 101st for TF [1.4a]"
  - "I am hung up on having a flexible force"
  - CG does think that the area involved and forces required implies some type of aviation/air assault capability
  - This may be the 101st (-)
- Must identify the conditions for transition
  - How do we transition to Phase IV B Stage I? Where do we want to be and what do we want to look like?
- Agreed with our initial focus on transition:
  - We must go into this thing knowing how we're going to transition ourselves to Phase IV B
- Priority for planning and transition tasks (note: CG stated tasks...*I've added purpii*)
  1) Control Baghdad *IOT allow a handover of the Baghdad AO to CFLCC*
  2) Reset our logistics *IOT allow the establishment of a Corps' sustainment structure in the new AO*
  3) Secure the KIRKUK oilfields *IOT promote local stability and allow long-term economic viability to the new Government*

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

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Battlestaff Planning Guidance

- Continue to update staff estimates (forces available and BOS specified tasks) based on:
  - Forces available 1 April
  - Tasks as outlined in ECLIPSE II Draft Base
- Review the following NLT 03 2000 Mar
  - Transition endstate
  - Mnvr Transition Tasks and concept(s)
  - Posted in Phase IV B folder in "COA Development"
- Identify the following NLT 04 1200 Mar
  - BOS supporting transition tasks based on this concept
- *Group review/group COA development TBD 4 March*

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